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In Laws 3, 680b-c the Athenian Stranger's positive evaluation of the Cyclopean 
'way of life' (Od. 9.112-15) is deeply indebted to Antisthenes' interpretatio 
Homerica of the Cyclopes as 'just' insofar they do not have the need of written 
law. Antisthenes' equation of 'need of law' with 'need of written law' is then 
contextualized within the unresolved tension, in the legislative project of the 
Laws, between oral dissemination ('proems' to the laws) and the potentially 
coercive power of the written text. Finally, Megillus' inept reply to the Homeric 
quotation by the Athenian Stranger allows us to gain a more nuanced view in the 
'readerly' dynamics enacted by the internal audience of the Laws. 
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The nature and goal of Plato’s engagement in book 3 of the Laws with what 
Barker, rather optimistically, called ‘The Lessons of History’,1 and the book’s 
import for the Laws’ overarching legislative project have been the subject of 
increasing scholarly interest in recent years.2 While sustained attention has 
mainly been paid to the properly historical parts of book 3 (682e8-693c5: the 
emergence and decadence of the Dorian states of Sparta, Argos and Messene;3 
693d1-698a8: Cyrus the Great’s enlightened rule of Persia; 698a9-699d4: 
Athens’ ‘ancient constitution’ at the time of the Persian Wars4), and to how they 
feed into the theoretical investigation of the principles of a healthy and stable 
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constitution, the so-called ‘archaeology’ section (676a-682e) has attracted 
comparatively less interest. This is even more so for the Athenian Stranger’s use 
of Homeric quotations (680b-c: Od. 9.112-15 and 681e: Il. 20.216-18) in the first 
part of book 3 to support his anthropological investigation into the early stages 
of human history. While previous scholarship has mostly focused on the 
Democritean resonances of this section,5  the aim of the present article is to 
explore some other unnoticed connections that underlie the first Homeric 
citation (Od. 9.112-15) by the Athenian Stranger. A contextual analysis of the 
qualified positive assessment given by the Athenian Stranger to the Cyclopean 
way of life (679e6-680a1) as ‘already some type of polity’ (680a9 πολιτείας δέ γε 
ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστίν τις οὗτος) and as a representative of the ‘most just 
kingship of all’ (680d2-3 βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην) will show that this 
claim is less eccentric than previously supposed and that its root may be found in 
a long-standing Homeric ‘problem’ (ζήτημα) whose solution (λύσις) goes back to 
Antisthenes. The recovery of this Antisthenic link in the Athenian Stranger’s 
mapping of the pre-history of human cultural evolution will also contribute to 
shedding further light on what has long been perceived by scholars as a major 
tension within the Laws: the rule of law, divided, as it is, between its inherent 
written nature and the need for a more flexible form of political advice and social 
control (the proems to the laws).6 Finally, at a more microscopic level, to 
introduce Antisthenes into the picture allows also for a more nuanced 
appreciation of Megillus’ ‘wrong’ reply to the Athenian Stranger’s quotation 
(680c6-d3), with consequences for the cultural world imagined to be inhabited 
by the internal audience of the Laws and its external readers (Sparta’s literacy 
and its acquaintance with Homer).7     
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The beginning of book 3 (676a-b) signals a shift of focus in the 
investigation so far pursued by the Athenian Stranger: after the digression into 
the civic virtue of the individual citizen in books 1 and 2,8 the new theme will be 
‘the changing progression [i.e. through time] of cities to virtue or vice’ (676a5-6 
τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν μεταβαίνουσαν ἅμα καὶ κακίαν).9 For this 
purpose the Athenian Stranger and his interlocutors will take as their vantage 
point ‘an infinitely long period of time and the changes that occur in it’ (676a8-
b1 ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι). The 
nature of historical causality with reference to political communities will thus be 
the guiding principle informing the new direction of the enquiry in book 3.10 
Once this agenda has been set, the Athenian Stranger establishes as a ‘credible’ 
premise (at least from the perspective of his interlocutors)11 the periodic 
occurrence of natural catastrophes (φθοραί) that, according to ‘the ancient 
stories’ (677a1 οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι), each time nearly wiped out humankind, 
leaving alive only a small portion of it (677a4-6).12 The adoption of cyclic natural 
cataclysms as a heuristic template allows the Athenian Stranger to structure his 
anthropology of the early stages of human history in such a way that 
‘mythologising becomes an inescapable aspect of the investigation of the past’ 
(Morgan 2013: 233).13  
The myth of origin developed by the Athenian Stranger relies on the 
acceptance of three premises:14 (1) that the ‘small embers’ (677b2 σμικρὰ 
ζώπυρα) of humankind rescued from the periodic destructions would each time 
live in small, isolated rural communities high up in the mountains, with scarce 
access to each other (677b); (2) that they would be shepherds (677e) and 
hunters (679a), feeding on milk and meat,15 resources that, if not plentiful, 
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would anyway suffice for their livelihood so as to eliminate the need to compete 
for survival (678e-679a); (3) this primitive humankind would also have some 
basic technai, like clothing, pottery, housing and bedding (679a), but, most 
importantly, they would not have metals and metal-working (678d): as a 
consequence their society would be untouched by contemporary evils such as 
excessive riches or poverty, hubris, injustice, envy, stasis and war (679b-d). The 
defining feature of this primitive humanity is, according to the Athenian 
Stranger, its form of ‘innocence’ / ‘simplicity’ of character (679c2-3 ἀγαθοὶ μὲν 
δὴ διὰ ταῦτά τε ἦσαν καὶ διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐήθειαν).16 The moral development 
of this early humankind is still embryonic  since at 678b1-3 we are told that 
perfection in virtue (and vice: τελέους πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ πρὸς κακίαν) can only 
happen when humanity reaches a relatively advanced technological stage.17 Yet 
the inhabitants of this post-apocalyptic period do nevertheless possess some 
form, if impoverished, of virtue:18 they are benevolently disposed towards each 
other (678e9 ἠγάπων καὶ ἐφιλοφρονοῦντο ἀλλήλους), and even if less 
technologically advanced and more ignorant than the present or past 
generations before the flood (679d3-4 τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ 
τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μὲν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι) they still are more ‘innocent’ in 
character, braver, more self-restrained and overall more just than later or earlier 
generations (679e2-3 εὐηθέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ ἅμα σωφρονέστεροι 
καὶ σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι). Though the cognitive sophistication of this primitive 
humankind is limited and openly acknowledged to be so by the Athenian 
Stranger (cf. 678b1-3 quoted above), the first survivors of the cyclic destructions 
do seem to have an intuitive, if underdeveloped, grasp of at least part of that 
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‘entirety of virtue’ at which a lawgiver worth his name must aim (1.630e1-3 οὐχ 
ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μόριον, ... ἐτίθει βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν).19 
It is precisely at this initial stage of the Athenian Stranger’s inquiry into 
the evolution of human society that Homer plays, as was to be expected,20 the 
lion’s share in providing additional evidence, thanks to divine inspiration, for the 
alleged historical truth of the developmental account reported by the Athenian 
Stranger.21 To explain to his interlocutors the form of political association of this 
primitive humankind (dunasteia or patriarchy), the Athenian Stranger draws on 
Homer’s description of the Cyclopean way of life: people living in a single 
household or clan (680d7-8 κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ γένος), with the eldest ruling 
the entire household (680e1-2). The passage is worth quoting in full (679e6-
680a1):  
 
ΑΘ. λελέχθω δὴ ταῦτα ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα ἔτι πάντα εἰρήσθω τοῦδ’ 
ἕνεκα, ἵνα νοήσωμεν τοῖς τότε νόμων τίς ποτ’ ἦν χρεία καὶ τίς ἦν νομοθέτης 
αὐτοῖς. 
ΚΛ. καὶ καλῶς γε εἴρηκας. 
ΑΘ. ἆρ’ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὔτ’ ἐδέοντο νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει κατὰ τούτους 
τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον; οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτωι 
τῶι μέρει τῆς περιόδου γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις 
ἑπόμενοι ζῶσιν. 
ΚΛ.  εἰκὸς γοῦν. 
ΑΘ. πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστίν τις οὗτος. 
ΚΛ. τίς; 
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ΑΘ. δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτωι τῶι χρόνωι πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, 
ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστίν· λέγει δ’ αὐτήν 
που καὶ Ὅμηρος γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οἴκησιν, εἰπὼν – 
        
       τοῖσιν δ’ οὔτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες, 
       ἀλλ’ οἵ γ’ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα 
       ἐν σπέεσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος 
       παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων, οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.  
                                                                  (Od. 9.112-15)  
 
ΚΛ. ἔοικέν γε ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῖν οὗτος γεγονέναι χαρίεις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ 
διεληλύθαμεν μάλ᾽ ἀστεῖα, οὐ μὴν πολλά γε· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες 
τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν. 
ΜΕ. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖ χρώμεθα μέν, καὶ ἔοικέν γε κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ποιητῶν, οὐ 
μέντοι Λακωνικόν γε ἀλλά τινα μᾶλλον Ἰωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστοτε. νῦν 
μὴν εὖ τῶι σῶι λόγωι ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ 
μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών. 
ΑΘ. ναί· συμμαρτυρεῖ γάρ, καὶ λάβωμέν γε αὐτὸν μηνυτὴν ὅτι τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι 
γίγνονταί ποτε. 
ΚΛ. καλῶς. 
ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος 
διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς22 τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει 
διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ 
ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν 
δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι; 
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ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
 
ATHENIAN STRANGER: What we have said so far and all that follows from it, let 
it be said for this reason, so that we may understand whatever need of laws the 
men of that time had and who was their lawgiver. 
CLEINIAS: You have put it well. 
ATHENIAN STRANGER: Is it not the case that those humans had no need of 
lawgivers and that in those times such a thing (i.e. the law)23 was not inclined to 
come into existence? For those born in that period of the cycle did not yet have 
but they lived in obedience to habits and the so-called ancestral customs.  
CLEINIAS: This is at least likely. 
ATHENIAN STRANGER: But this too is already a type of polity. 
CLEINIAS: Which one? 
ATHENIAN STRANGER: Everyone seems to me to call the polity that then existed 
dunasteia, and it still exists now in many places among both Greeks and 
barbarians. Homer too, I suppose, says that it exists, when he says concerning 
the household system of the Cyclopes: 
 
  they do not have assemblies to take council nor ordinances, 
  but they dwell on the top of lofty mountains 
  in hollow caves and each rules over 
his children and wives, and they do not trouble themselves about 
one another. 
(Od. 9.112-15) 
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CLEINIAS: This poet of yours seems to have been charming. For we have also 
gone through other verses of his that were very refined, but not very many, at 
any rate: for we Cretans do not make much use of foreign poetry. 
MEGILLUS: But we Spartans do and consider him the best among such poets; 
however, the way of life he describes each time is not Laconian but rather Ionian 
of some sort. And in the present circumstances he seems to bear good witness to 
your claim by referring the primitive ways of the Cyclopes, in his storytelling, to 
their savagery.  
ATHENIAN STRANGER: Yes, for he supports us with his testimony; let us take 
him, at any rate, as evidence that such polities do sometimes arise. 
CLEINIAS: Fine. 
ATHENIAN STRANGER: So, did not these forms of polities arise out of these 
people who had been scattered in single households and in separate families by 
the dearth of resources that occurred in the periods of destruction? And is it not 
the case that in these communities the eldest ones rule because the authority 
comes to them from their parents, and that, by following them, they will form, as 
birds do, a single flock,24 being ruled by paternal authority25, that is,26 by a 
kingship that is the most just of all? 
CLEINIAS: Very true. 
 
Plato’s commentators have usually either passed over the Homeric quotation by 
the Athenian Stranger in silence,27 or have limited themselves to noting that Od. 
9.114-15 is also cited by Aristotle in Politics 1252b22-2428 to exemplify, as in 
Plato, the role of patriarchal communities within human society.29 Recent 
exceptions are Dušanić’s attempt to see in the Homeric Cyclopes a veiled allusion 
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to Macedonian power via Dem. 18.6730 and Dillon’s suggestion that at Laws 680b 
we are dealing with a perversely ironical quotation of Homer by Plato, thus 
emphasizing the deep-seated ambiguity of the Golden Age myth.31 Both 
interpretations seem to me unsatisfactory. Even leaving aside the fact that the 
supposed verbal link between our passage of the Laws and Dem. 18.67 is of the 
flimsiest (the occurrence of the term dunasteia in both passages), Dušanić 
entirely neglects the fact that the Cyclopean way of life is introduced at 680b-c 
by the Athenian Stranger to illustrate the form of political association enjoyed by 
the primitive and virtuous humanity described at 677a-679e. As for Dillon’s 
interpretation, while there is no doubt that Cleinias and Megillus’ reaction to the 
Homeric quotation implies some ironic and condescending banter on the part of 
the Athenian Stranger,32 the very fact that some of same Homeric lines are cited 
also by Aristotle, via Plato, in his Politics to make an analogous point seems to 
me to reduce significantly the possibility that Plato is here spectacularly re-
deploying Homer against Homer, so to speak.33  
We have already observed that the Athenian Stranger introduces the 
‘Cyclopean way of life’ not as an example of the spontaneous and bountiful 
generosity of nature in a distant Golden Age or as a paradigm of hubristic, sub-
human behaviour,34 but on the contrary as an illustration of the form of political 
association of a primitive humankind that is ‘simpler, braver, more self-
restrained and overall more just’ than past or present generations of men (cf. 
679e2-3). According to the Athenian Stranger’s version, this early humanity can 
be compared to the Cyclopes and be called ‘lawless’ (Od. 9.112 τοῖσιν δ’ οὔτ’ 
ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες) inasmuch as it does not need lawgiving 
because of its tendencies towards virtuous behaviour: the need for laws simply 
  
10 
does not apply to these early humans (cf. 680a1 for the χρεία motif and 680a3-4 
οὔτ’ ἐδέοντο νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι 
τὸ τοιοῦτον;). Lawgiving proper comes into being only at the next stage of 
human evolution (680e6-681d6): the scattered households congregate to farm 
and live in a single larger unit (681a3 μίαν οἰκίαν κοινὴν καὶ μεγάλην 
ἀποτελοῦντες). It is only then that the problem emerges of how to blend 
different traditions and how to distribute powers:35 chosen representatives 
(681c8 κοινούς) will then review the rules of all the families and propose rules 
that recommend themselves for common use (681c7-d5).36 These 
representatives will thus be called nomothetai (681d2).37 Furthermore, at 
680a5-7 we are also told that the early humans who survived the flood do not 
have laws because they do not yet have writing; hence their reliance on ancestral 
customs only (680a5-7 οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτωι τῶι μέρει τῆς 
περιόδου γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἑπόμενοι 
ζῶσιν).38 
 If we bear in mind this connection between justice, absence of the need of 
law and absence of writing with relation to the early stages of humankind, a 
more productive way of making sense of why the Cyclopes are brought into the 
picture by the Athenian Stranger precisely at this stage of the evolutionary 
ladder is offered to us by the Homeric scholia to Od. 9.106.39 The text of the 
scholia THMVd to Od. 9.106 is the following:40 
 
(T1) Scholium T ad Od. ι 106 (= Schrader pp. 86,14-87,10) = Antisthenes SSR V 
A 189, ll. 1-14 (= F 53 Decleva Caizzi) 
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Κυκλώπων δ᾽ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστων: πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ 
ἀθεμίστους καὶ παρανόμους εἰπὼν τοὺς Κύκλωπας ἄφθονα παρὰ θεῶν αὐτοῖς 
ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὰ ἀγαθά; ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ 
σώματος, ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμωι χρωμένους ἐγγράφωι διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον 
τῶν ἰδίων ἄρχειν· θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχου (v. 115), ὅπερ 
ἀνομίας σημεῖον.  Ἀντισθένης δέ φησιν ὅτι μόνον τὸν Πολύφημον εἶναι ἄδικον· 
καὶ γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν. οὐκοῦν οἱ λοιποὶ δίκαιοι· διὰ τοῦτο 
γὰρ καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς τὰ πάντα ἀναδιδόναι αὐτόματον, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι 
αὐτὴν δίκαιον ἔργον ἐστίν. ἀλλ’ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπε βιαίους, οἵ σφεας σινέσκοντο, 
βίηφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν (Od. ζ, 6), ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς Γίγαντας· ὅσπερ ὑπερθύμοισι 
Γιγάντεσσιν βασίλευεν (Od. η, 59), ὥστε καὶ τοὺς Φαίακας βλαπτομένους ὑπ᾽ 
αὐτῶν μεταναστῆναι. ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας.  
 
to the land of the Cyclopes who are hyperphialoi and athemistoi: how can [the 
poet] call the Cyclopes arrogant, lawless and transgressing the law and then say 
that the gods grant them unbegrudgingly the goods [of nature]? We must then 
say that he called them hyperphialoi because of the excessive size of their 
bodies41 and athemistoi inasmuch as they do not make use of written laws 
because each of them rules over his own: θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ’ 
ἀλόχου (v. 115), which is evidence of their lack of laws. Antisthenes says that 
only Polyphemus is unjust, for he truly despises Zeus. Surely then the others are 
just.42 For it is because of this [i.e. their justice] that the earth produces 
everything spontaneously for them and the fact that they do not plough the land 
is thus an act of justice. But previously [the poet] called them violent: ‘[the 
Cyclopes] who plundered them [the Phaeacians] since they were stronger’ (Od. 
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8.6), and so he called also the Giants: ‘[Eurymedon] who rules over the 
overweening Giants’, so that the Phaeacians too, being hurt by them, had to 
relocate elsewhere. This happened because of the different nature of their (i.e. 
the Cyclopes’) political organisation.43    
 
 
(T2) Scholium M ad Od. ι 106 (= Schrader p. 86 in his apparatus) 
δίκαιοι οὗτοι πλὴν Πολυφήμου. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ὑπερφιάλων νῦν μεγάλων, τὸ δὲ 
ἀθεμίστων μὴ ἐχόντων χρείαν νόμων διὰ τὸ θεμιστεύειν ἕκαστον παίδων ἠδ᾽ 
ἀλόχων. πῶς δὲ  ἠδίκουν τοὺς Φαίακας καὶ ἐλύπουν δίκαιοι ὄντες; διὰ τὸ 
ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας.44  
 
These were just except Polyphemus. Hence the word hyperphialōn refers now to 
those who are big and the word athemistōn to those who do not have need of 
laws because each rules over his own children and women. But how is it that the 
Cyclopes, if they were just, did wrong and harmed the Phaeacians? Because of 
their different political organisation. 
 
 
(T3) Scholium H ad Od. ι 106 (= Schrader p. 87, 11-13) = Antisthenes SSR V A 
189, ll. 15-17  
ὑπερφιάλων: τῶν μεγαλοφυῶν τῶι σώματι· τῶν δισήμων γὰρ ἡ λέξις. 
ἀθεμίστων δὲ τῶν νόμοις μὴ χρωμένων· φησὶ γὰρ θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων 
ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων.  
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hyperphialōn: those who have a big body by nature, for the word is one of those 
which can have two meanings. athemistōn: those who do not use laws, for [the 
poet] says ‘each rules over their own children and women.’  
 
 
(T4) Scholium Vd ad Od. ι 106 (= Schrader pp. 87, 13-17, and 87, 21-88, 8) = 
Antisthenes SSR V A 189, ll. 17-39.   
 
(i) εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἀθεμίστων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀδίκων, πῶς λέγει οἵ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες (v. 
107); εἰ δ’ εἴποι τις, καὶ πῶς ὁ Πολύφημός φησιν οὐ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου 
ἀλέγουσι (v. 275); σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅτι Πολυφήμου ἐστὶ τοῦ ὠμοφάγου 
καὶ θηριώδους ... [versus Hesiodi Op. 277-9 sequuntur]  ὥστε Πολύφημον μόνον 
λέγει ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἄδικον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας Κύκλωπας εὐσεβεῖς καὶ 
δικαίους καὶ πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅθεν καὶ ἀνῆκεν αὐτοῖς αὐτομάτως ἡ γῆ 
τοὺς καρπούς. 
 
for if athemistōn stood for ‘unjust’, why does the poet say of them ‘who trust in 
the gods’ (v. 107); but if someone were to say, ‘And how is it that Polyphemus 
says ‘the Cyclopes do not care about aigis-bearing Zeus’ (v. 275)?’ Let him 
consider the question from the point of view of the speaking character: that of 
Polyphemus, who eats raw flesh and is as wild as a beast ... so that [the poet] calls 
Polyphemus, and him only, arrogant and unjust, but all the other Cyclopes pious, 
just and trusting in the gods. And this is the very reason why the soil 
spontaneously produces fruits for them. 
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(ii) ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστων: οὔ φασι συμφερόντως εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο· τοιαῦτα ἐκ 
θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι ἀκούειν ἀσύμφορον. λύεται δὲ τῆι λέξει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ὑπερφίαλον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ κρείττονος τάττεται. οὐ γὰρ μνηστῆρες 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἔλεγον ἄν οὐκ ἀγαπᾶις ὃ ἕκηλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ᾽ ἡμῖν δαίνυσαι 
(φ 289). τὸ δὲ ἀθέμιστον τὸ μὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσμοῖς χρῆσθαί φασιν, ὡς τὸ 
 
τοῖσιν δ’ οὔτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες, 
ἀλλ’ οἵ γ’ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα 
ἐν σπέεσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος 
παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων, οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι 
(ι 112 sqq.) 
 
ὅτι μὲν χρῶνται τῆι θέμιδι δηλοῖ, πλὴν οὐ κοινῆι. 
 
hyperphialōn athemistōn: they say that this [i.e. the choice of the expressions 
hyperphialōn and athemistōn] has not been said properly: it is unbecoming to 
read that the gods granted them such gifts. But the problem is solved if we take 
into account the linguistic usage: for the term hyperphialos is applied also to 
what is big and more powerful; otherwise the suitors could not have said of 
themselves ‘Are you not content that you are feasting undisturbed in our 
company, we who are hyperphialoi?᾽ As to the term athemistos, they say that it 
means ‘to make no use of shared ordinances’, for the lines ... clearly show that the 
Cyclopes do use ordinances, but not commonly shared ones.  
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(T5) Scholium Vd ad Od. ι 115 (= Schrader p. 88, 9-17) = Antisthenes SSR V A 
189, ll. 40-47  
 
οὐδ᾽ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν· ἀδικίαν καὶ παρανομίαν ἐγκαλεῖ τοῖς Κύκλωψιν 
ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ποιητής, ὡς μὴ προνοουμένοις ἀλλήλων. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει, ὅτι 
διὰ τὴν ἄγαν δικαιοσύνην καὶ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἄλλως 
ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐδὲ ἐδέοντο τῆς ἀλλήλων προνοίας. ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἔχει δῆλον ἐκ 
Πολυφήμου· τούτου γὰρ κράξαντος συνῆλθον ἅπαντες (v. 401). τινὲς δὲ τὸ οὐκ 
ἀλέγουσιν ἀλλήλους οὕτω φασίν· οὐ φροντίζουσιν ἀλλήλων ὅσον ἕνεκεν 
ὑποταγῆς· ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται τῶι ἑτέρωι. 
 
they do not care for each other: here the poet charges the Cyclopes with lack of 
justice and unlawfullness as if they did not have forethought for each other. But 
[in using these words] the poet rather indicates that it is because of their great 
sense of justice and of not taking advantage over each other or being wronged in 
any other way that they did not even need to have forethought for each other. 
That this is the case is clear from Polyphemus: for when he cries out, everyone 
comes together (l. 401). Some take the expression ‘they do not care for each 
other’ to mean the following: they do not worry about each other inasmuch as 
rank is concerned; for each is master of his own and is not subject to anyone else. 
 
 
The Antisthenic origin of the whole section of the scholia THMVd to Od. 9.106 
about the ‘justice’ of the Cyclopes has long been recognized by both Homeric and 
presocratic scholars.45 If we believe the scholia, it is Antisthenes who first 
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systematically championed a positive view of the way of life of the Cyclopes, 
pious (εὐσεβεῖς) and just (δίκαιοι), with the exception of Polyphemus, the only 
villain. It is also Antisthenes that first linked the ‘lawlessness’ of the Cyclopes to 
the lack of need of law proper (cf. T2 τὸ δὲ ἀθεμίστων μὴ ἐχόντων χρείαν νόμων 
διὰ τὸ θεμιστεύειν ἕκαστον παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων; T3 ἀθεμίστων δὲ τῶν νόμοις μὴ 
χρωμένων; T4 (ii) τὸ δὲ ἀθέμιστον τὸ μὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσμοῖς χρῆσθαί φασιν...  
ὅτι μὲν χρῶνται τῆι θεμίδι δηλοῖ, πλὴν οὐ κοινῆι), and above all it is again 
Antisthenes who connected the absence of ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι and θέμιστες of 
the Cyclopean society to the lack of written law (cf. T1 ... ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ 
νόμωι χρωμένους ἐγγράφωι). While hunting for traces of Antisthenic resonances 
in Plato’s writings is not an unknown exercise among modern scholars,46 the 
specific Antisthenic echo of our passage has so far escaped the attention of 
critics.47 Laws 3.680b-c should thus find its place among the testimonia of 
Antisthenes’ early (if not almost-contemporary) reception in the fourth century 
BC. The fact that Plato has the Athenian Stranger quoting Od. 9.112-15 in the 
‘archaeological’ section of his human history to exemplify the pre-political set up 
of a primitive and virtuous humankind does suggest that Antisthenes’ 
interpretatio homerica of the Cyclopes already had some currency among Plato’s 
potential readers, at least the most alert ones. And it is indeed on the 
sophistication and alertness (or lack thereof) of Megillus as a Homeric reader 
acquainted with Antisthenes’ λύσις that much of the irony of 680c6-d5 depends.  
But before unravelling the narrative strategy underlying the Athenian 
Stranger’s exchange with Megillus qua Homeric reader, let us first dwell briefly 
on the significance of this Antisthenic echo for the legislative project of the Laws 
as a whole. The link between the rule of law and written legislation is of 
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paramount importance for Plato’s political agenda in the Laws:48 in the second-
best city, writing qua political medium is explicitly rehabilitated by Plato49 and 
the future inhabitants of Magnesia will literally have the Laws as their 
‘prescribed’ school-book (7.811e5-812a1). The written text of the Laws itself 
will be both the training text of the future Magnesian teachers, who must 
understand it and approve of it, and the textbook of the pupils (811e5-6 καὶ 
πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζειν μανθάνειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν …, 
811e8-812a1 τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς παραδιδόναι διδάσκειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν).50 
Further on at 10.890e6-891a4 Plato has the Cretan Cleinias suggesting that the 
writing medium is ‘in a sense the greatest help for an intelligent legislation’ (καὶ 
μὴν καὶ νομοθεσίαι γέ ἐστίν που τῆι μετὰ φρονήσεως μεγίστη βοήθεια): ‘for the 
orders of the laws, once set down in writing (τὰ περὶ νόμους προστάγματα ἐν 
γράμμασι τεθέντα), remain absolutely the same (πάντως ἠρεμεῖ),51 as though 
ready to submit to examination for all time (ὡς δώσοντα εἰς πάντα χρόνον 
ἔλεγχον), so that if they are difficult to listen to at the start one must not be 
afraid, since even a slow learner will be able to go back to examining them 
frequently (ἅ γ’ ἔσται καὶ τῶι δυσμαθεῖ πολλάκις ἐπανιόντι σκοπεῖν)’. Whether 
we are inclined or not to take seriously Cleinias’ ‘political’ defence of writing,52 
what nevertheless makes it feasible within the communicational networks of the 
second-best city is that in Magnesia the legislator will have authorial control over 
the reception and dissemination of his text. Part of Socrates’ critique of writing in 
the Phaedrus was directed not only towards the dialectic ‘passivity’ of writing as 
a medium (275d) but also towards the possibility of misinterpretation generated 
by a process of transmission that is virtually open-ended — an open-endedness 
that enables the text to reach equally the ‘informed’ and the ignorant or biased 
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readers (275e1-5).53 The process of circulation envisaged by Plato’s Socrates, in 
the Phaedrus, presupposes unfavourable conditions of dissemination, fostered 
by ignorance (παρ’ οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει) and hostile, competitive attitudes 
(πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκηι λοιδορηθείς). In sum, it presupposes an 
agonistic scenario of competing written discourses, each pitched at each other’s 
interpretation. But this will not be the case in Magnesia where ‘the writings of 
the lawgiver’ (12.957d5 τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου γράμματα) will be the ‘clear 
touchstone’ (12.957d4-5 βάσανος … σαφής) of all other ‘public discourses’ 
(logoi) of praise and blame (ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι) prompted by ‘emulation’ 
(philonikia) be they in verse or prose, written or oral (12.957d1-3). The 
discourse of the law will thus be like an ‘antidote to the other speeches’ 
(12.957d6 καθάπερ ἀλεξιφάρμακα τῶν ἄλλων λόγων). The writings of the 
lawgiver will not be in competition with other writings.54 The untrained, reckless 
nature of the audience as envisaged in the Phaedrus is not a psychological 
condition that can be predicated of the Magnesian citizens-to-be: they will have 
been properly ‘trained’ to be responsive and attentive to the legislator’s law and 
his purpose via the oral ‘fiction’ of the proems to the laws.55  
To go back to where we started: Plato’s specific commitment, in the Laws, 
to writing as a political medium finds in Antisthenes’ equation of ‘need of law’ 
with ‘need of written law’ a useful ally for his pessimistic view of the corrupting 
influence of political power in historical societies. The necessity of the rule of 
written law is a second-best option (the first being knowledge) because of the 
inherent defectiveness of human nature when confronted with power (9.874e7-
875d5). Only a primitive humanity which, by a combination of environmental 
factors and moral outlook, was inherently ‘more just’ than historically developed 
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societies could survive without the need (chreia) of written laws. This is a 
paradoxical consequence of the unresolved tension, in the Laws, between the 
coercive power of the written law and its oral dissemination through the 
‘proems’: in Plato’s Magnesia the very same ‘habits and so-called ancestral 
customs’ (3.680a6-7), which informed the ‘just’ life of the first human 
community to survive the flood, will be co-opted as part of the new law-code 
through the textuality of the Laws itself as a written oeuvre.56   
Let us now turn to the response of the internal audience of the Laws, 
Cleinias and Megillus, to the Athenian Stranger’s quotation and use of Homer’s 
Od. 9.112-15. Martin has recently shown how in Plato’s Laws the ‘citation and 
manipulation of Homeric poetry and poetics’ is central to the structure of the 
Laws itself.57 Part and parcel of Homer’s paradoxical ‘hidden centrality’ in the 
Laws is ‘the shocking realisation that for some Greeks in antiquity, Homer was a 
distant country’.58 This point is very strongly brought home at 680c2-d5: both 
Cleinias and Megillus, though broadly agreeing with the Athenian Stranger’s 
conclusion, ostensibly fail to engage in any detail with his use of the Homeric 
citation. Whereas Cleinias’ comment on the Cretans’ casual acquaintance with 
Homer (680c4-5 οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν) is 
briefly and humorously articulated through standard terms of literary criticism 
(680c2 ὁ ποιητής ... χαρίεις, 680c3 μαλ᾽ ἀστεῖα), Megillus’ reaction, followed by 
the Athenian Stranger’s rejoinder, is more complex and requires some unpacking 
(see above 680c6-d5). 
In particular, two features of Megillus’ reply deserve attention: while 
acknowledging the primacy of Homer as a poet and his diffusion at Sparta, 
Megillus (i) immediately connects the Homeric poems with ‘a way of life’ that is 
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more Ionian than Spartan and (ii) links the primitive ways of life of the Cyclopes 
(τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν) to their ‘savagery’ (ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα ... ἐπανενεγκών), a 
feature of the Κυκλώπειος βίος intentionally unmentioned by the Athenian 
Stranger. As to (i), Martin has connected this passage –  rightly, in my view – 
with Plut. Lyc. 4.3-4, where we are told that during his journeys Lycurgus sailed 
from Crete to Asia, with the aim of comparing the Cretan civilization, simple and 
severe, with that of the Ionians, extravagant and luxurious. (Plut. Lyc. 4.3 
βουλόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, ταῖς Κρητικαῖς διαίταις, εὐτελέσιν οὔσαις καὶ 
αὐστηραῖς, τὰς Ἰωνικὰς πολυτελείας καὶ τρυφάς ... παραβαλὼν ἀποθεωρῆσαι 
τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν βίων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν). It is during this anthropological and 
‘nomological’ quest that Lycurgus first encounters the text of Homer at Samos via 
the descendants of Creophylus (Plut. Lyc. 4.4 ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ὁμήρου ποιήμασιν 
ἐντυχὼν πρῶτον, ὡς ἔοικε, παρὰ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις τοῖς Κρεοφύλου 
διατηρουμένοις). Lycurgus, we are told, recognized that the political and 
educative lessons of the Homeric text were not inferior to the part dedicated to 
pleasure and licence (κατιδὼν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῖς πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀκρασίαν 
διατριβαῖς τὸ πολιτικὸν καὶ παιδευτικὸν οὐκ ἐλάττονος ἄξιον σπουδῆς 
ἀναμεμιγμένον). Hence, the Spartan lawgiver eagerly copied the Homeric text in 
order to take it home with him (ἐγράψατο προθύμως καὶ συνήγαγεν ὡς δεῦρο 
κομιῶν),59 making Homer’s poetry really known among Greeks (γνωρίμην δὲ 
αὐτὴν καὶ μάλιστα πρῶτος ἐποίησε Λυκοῦργος). Martin emphasises how in 
Megillus’ reply Lycurgus is deliberately ‘gapped out’ by Plato the author over the 
head of Megillus the character, inasmuch as Lycurgus ‘is not celebrated for the 
promotion of Homer as a way to benefit his polis with political and educational 
lessons’.60 This may be part of the Athenian Stranger’s strategy, but there is also 
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another possible inference to be drawn from the comparison between Plutarch’s 
Life of Lycurgus and Plato’s Laws 3, 680c6-d5. As is well known, two different 
versions of Lycurgus’ ‘encounter with Homer’ are attested in our sources:61 
either Lycurgus did meet Homer in person62 — and in this strand of the tradition 
we hear nothing specific about the transmission and dissemination of the 
Homeric text as such — or he is said to have imported the Homeric poems to 
Sparta via Samos and the Creophylean guild.63 The origin of this second version 
is debated,64 but scholars seem to be unanimous in considering the Peripatetic 
Heraclides Lembus (second century BC) our earliest extant witness for this 
strand of the tradition before Plutarch (Her. Lemb. Excerpta politiarum 10 Dilts 
 Arist. fr. 661.10 Rose = F 107 Gigon).65 As acknowledged by Martin, Laws 3, 
680c6-d5 does leave plenty unsaid (no mention of Lycurgus and his journey to 
Ionia). Yet the specific connection established by Megillus between Homeric 
poetry and an Ionian way of life (rather than a Spartan) seems, at least to me, to 
suggest that Plato did mean (albeit selectively)  to refer to – and to be 
understood by his external audience as referring to –  that second strand of the 
tradition.66 Irrespective of whether we believe this tradition to be genuinely 
archaic or not, and of the topicality of the association between mythical 
lawgivers and the comparison of βίοι and πολιτεῖαι, our passage of Laws 3, 
680c6-d5 stands a plausible chance as candidate for a reflection of the early 
reception of Lycurgus’ encounter with the Homeric text, together with 
Heraclides Lembus.  
 But what about Megillus’ interpretation, not of Homer in general, but of 
Od. 9.112-15 in particular? Why does Megillus bring in the ‘savagery’ (ἀγριότης) 
of the Cyclopes? Already Weil noticed that, strictly speaking, there is nothing 
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specific about the Cyclopes’ savagery in the Homeric quotation by the Athenian 
Stranger, and very little anyway in book 9 of the Odyssey.67 According to Weil, 
the explanation for Megillus’ blundering answer should be sought in Plato’s 
willingness to make of Megillus ‘un exemple de “critique du document” et 
d’interprétation historique’: ‘Mégillos a cru trouver chez Homère un raisonment 
— qui n’y est pas. L’Athénien écarte ce raisonnement, et en revient à un fait 
précis. C’est exactement la méthode de Thucydide, qui trouve dans Homère des 
“indices” de fait’ (Weil 1959: 71). I would like to suggest that Megillus is here 
being exposed by the Athenian Stranger68 also, if not mainly, as a naive reader of 
Homer who has not understood Antisthenes’ interpretatio homerica of the 
Cyclopes, as presupposed by the Odyssey quotation at 680b-c.69 One of the 
methods adopted by Antisthenes in his λύσις on the ‘justice’ of the Cyclopes, 
along other standard ones (linguistic usage and semantic variation: T4 (ii) 
λύεται δὲ τῆι λέξει, T3 τῶν δισήμων γὰρ ἡ λέξις), is that of doing precisely what 
Megillus has not been able to do in his capacity as Homeric reader: to distinguish 
between authorial voice and character’s focalization (cf. T4 (i) σκοπείτω τὸ 
πρόσωπον κτλ.).70 The only explicit reference to the Cyclopes’ ἀγριότης in 
Odyssey 9 is voiced by Odysseus, as a self-interested narrator of his apologos to 
the Phaeacians about Polyphemus only (Od. 9. 215 ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας ἐὺ εἰδότα 
οὔτε θέμιστας). Had Megillus’ applied the λύσις ἐκ προσώπου adopted by 
Antisthenes, he would not have drawn a wrong inference about the societal 
standards of the Cyclopean society. Megillus’ maladroit answer, and his lack of 
proficiency as an alert Homeric reader acquainted with the most recent trend of 
literary criticism is a further way in which Plato, via the Athenian Stranger, 
represents Homer and his poetry as ‘an overtly Athenian possession’.71 To 
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identify Antisthenes’ interpretatio homerica of the Cyclopes as the conceptual 
framework exploited by the Athenian Stranger in his quotation of Od. 9.112-15 
allows us both to make better sense of the purpose and aim of the quotation 
itself, within the broader structure of the Laws, and also to gain a more nuanced 
view of the ‘readerly’ dynamics enacted by the internal audience of the Laws.  
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2 For the importance of the historical digression of book 3 in the Laws as a whole, 
see above all Schofield (2010) 18-21, 25-26 and (2013) 288-96. On Plato’s 
‘mythical history’ in Laws 3, see Morgan (2012), Nightingale (1999) 
(emphasising the underlying thematic continuity between book 3 and the 
cosmological section of book 10). On Plato’s reflections on history in book 3 as 
an indirect critique of a distinctly Thucydidean view of the goals of historical 
enquiry, see Farrar (2013) and Tulli (2003). For Plato re-reading Thucydides in 
the ‘archaeological’ section of book 3, see already the pioneering work by Weil 
(1959). All the quotation from the Laws in this article are taken from the Budé 
edition. 
3 The most detailed treatment of Plato’s engagement with Doric, and most 
specifically Spartan, traditions in this section is that by Schöpsdau (1994) 383-
451; cf. also Wilke (1997) 177-79 and Morgan (2012) 244-52 on how the ‘point 
of transition’ to history proper (the emergence of the Doric ἔθνος), in book 3, is 
also ‘a point of continuity’ with the previous quasi-mythical section: in the 
narrative of the Athenian Stranger the example of historical Sparta provides the 
explanation for the ‘congruence between history and theory’ he advocates.  
4 On Plato’s subversive exploitation of traditional stereotypes in both the Persian 
and Athenian section of book 3 about mixed constitutions, see Schofield (2013) 
288-97, Farrar (2013) and Rowe (2007).  
5 See esp. the work by Cole (1967) 97-106, with Solmsen’s caveats , (1969) 402. 
For a sceptical view of Plato’s dependence on Democritus’ anthropology in the 
‘archaeology’ of Laws 3, see more recently Müller (1987) 214 and Schöpsdau 
(1994) 358 with further bibliography. On the importance of ‘necessity’ and 
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‘need’  in Democritus’ anthropological account of the evolution of humankind 
and on nomoi as ‘developed by a process of natural necessity, the necessity for 
human beings to develop co-operative strategies enabling them to achieve their 
natural goals despite their natural limitations’, see above all Taylor (2007) 1-9 
(the quotation is from p. 9).  
6 On the unresolved tension between the fixed, written form of the law and the 
proems in the Laws, see above all Laks (2000) and Bertrand (1999) 229-46, 
326-36. For Plato’s qualified political rehabilitation of writing in connection with 
lawgiving in both the Laws and the Statesman and its relationship to the 
Phaedrus’ critique of writing qua writing, see recently the perceptive analysis by 
Lane (2013a) and (2013b). 
7 Martin (2013) 324-25 touches upon this issue (he brings in Plut. Lyc. 4.2-4 with 
reference to Megillus’ reply), but does not elaborate on it (see below).  
8 Cf. 3, 682e8-11 on the digressive nature of the excursus of book 2 about music 
and drunkenness. 
9 I retain the transmitted μεταβαίνουσαν versus Boeckh’s emendation 
μεταβαινουσῶν: see England (1921) I 344. 
10 Cf. also 676c6-7 ταύτης δὴ πέρι λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν 
αἰτίαν. 
11 Cf. Cleinias’ reply at 677a7: πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί. 
12 On the different handling of these myths of disaster by Plato in the Statesman 
and the Timaeus/Critias, see Morgan (2012) 228-33 and Dillon (1997). For the 
various accounts of human evolution offered by Plato across his corpus, see 
Piette (1985) and Lovejoy and Boas (1965) 155-68.  
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13 On the mixture of oral sources (677a1 οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι) and informed 
guesswork (e.g. 677b9 εἰκός, 677a7 πιθανόν) in this portion of Plato’s 
‘archaeology’, and its relation to Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ methods of inquiry 
for the most distant past, see Weil (1959) 42-54; cf. also Tulli (2003). 
14 The whole argument is presented as an argument from probability rather than 
a syllogistic demonstration.  
15 For vegetarianism, markedly absent in the Athenian Stranger’s version of the 
myth of origin, as a typical feature of the Golden Age, see Vidal-Naquet (1986); 
on the Cyclopes as prototypical example of pastoralist vegetarians and, at the 
same time, cannibals, see Bakker (2013) 53-73.  
16 On Plato’s shifting conceptualization of εὐήθεια across his oeuvre, see Gaudin 
(1981). That at 679c2-3 the Athenian Stranger qualifies it as ‘the so-called 
simplicity’ indicates the extent to which Plato is willing to go to bestow a positive 
moral outlook to this primitive state of humankind. 
17 Cf. also 678a7-9 oὐκοῦν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν διακειμένων οὕτω τὰ νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν 
σύμπαντα, πόλεις τε καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ τέχναι καὶ νόμοι, καὶ πολλὴ μὲν πονηρία, 
πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἀρετή; On the co-existence of both progress and regress in every 
stage of human history in the narrative of the Athenian Stranger, see Nightingale 
(1999) 301 and 304-06. 
18 See Schofield (2006) 203 on the positive moral characterization of these early 
communities. 
19 For justice, moderation and wisdom, alongside courage (δικαιοσύνη καὶ 
σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθοῦσαι μετ’ ἀνδρείας), as representing 
the σύμπασα ἀρετή that is the goal of ‘true’ legislation, see 1, 630a8-b2. For the 
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interchangeable use of φρόνησις and σοφία in the Laws, see Bobonich (2002) 
197-201 and esp. 520-21 n. 124.  
20 For Homer as the ‘first historian’, see the overview by Kim (2010) 22-46 and 
Graziosi (2002) 118-21.  
21 Cf. 682a1-5 λέγει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ περὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων 
εἴρηκεν, κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ 
ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν 
γιγνομένων σύν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε. On the whole 
passage, see Schöpsdau (1994) 373-74, especially 373 on the heavily conditional 
validation of poets’ access to truth: ‘Die Aussage in a3-5 besagt natürlich nicht, 
dass Dichter kraft göttlicher Inspiration immer und ausschliesslich Wahres 
verkünden, sondern nur, dass sie, falls sie Wahres sagen (was nicht immer der 
Fall ist), dies jeweils göttlicher Inspiration verdanken (und nicht wirklichem 
Wissen)’. Notice that already at 680d4-5 Homer is said to συμμαρτυρεῖν what 
the Athenian Stranger has argued so far in his quality of μηνυτής (on the use of 
this word by Plato, with specific reference to poets and their relation to the 
distant past, see Tulli (1994) 13-15, 19-20 on Laws 680d4-5): μηνυτής is not 
someone who discovers or creates anew something which did not exist before 
but someone who ‘reveals’ something which was already there but kept hidden 
and obscure. That is, poetry is represented here by Plato not as an independent 
source of knowledge per se but simply as a further piece of supporting evidence, 
circumscribed and conditional, which confirms a ‘truth’ already obtained 
through another medium, i.e. philosophical inquiry. For the poet as ‘witness’ in 
Plato, see also Halliwell (2000) 98 n. 19. 
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22 I retain the ms reading αἷς and understand the antecedent of the relative to be 
τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι of 680d5: see England (1921) I 352 ad loc.  
23 The exact referent of τὸ τοιοῦτον at 680a4 is debated: I side with England 
(1921) I 351 ad loc. in translating it ‘such a thing as a law’ rather than, by 
synecdoche, ‘such a thing as a lawyer’. See also the recent translation by Brisson 
and Pradeau (2006) I 169: ‘N’est-il pas vrai que ... à l’époque, on n’avait aucun 
besoin de se donner quelche chose de semblable à des lois?’ 
24 For the Homeric image, see already Weil (1959) 72 ad loc. with parallels. 
25 For this meaning of πατρονομούμενοι at 680e3, see England (1921) I 352; cf. 
also Weil (1959) 72 ad loc. 
26 The epexegetical value of καί, explaining the ambiguous πατρονομούμενοι, has 
been kindly pointed out to me by the anonymous referee. 
27 Cf. e.g. England (1921) vol. I ad loc.; Schöpsdau (1994) 367 has useful 
observations on the ‘constitutional’ profile of the δυναστεία evoked by the 
Homeric quotation but is not interested in asking why Plato introduces the 
Cyclopes as a foil for the δικαιότεροι people of human prehistory. Labarbe 
(1949) 236-38 discusses the textual variants of the Homeric texts offered by the 
Platonic manuscript tradition. 
28 πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι, διὰ 
τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος “θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων 
ἠδ’ ἀλόχων”. σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὤικουν. 
29 Cf. e.g. Weil (1959) 69-70; on Aristotle’s partial dependence on the Laws 
passage, see Kullmann (1991) 96-97; Schütrumpf (1991) 200-01; Saunders 
(1995) 111. Od. 9.114-15 θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων is alluded to 
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by Aristotle also in NE 10, 1180a27-29 καὶ ζῆι ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, 
κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχου (the Odyssey mss have plural 
ἀλόχων) but with a very different function (as an example of neglect on the part 
of the state to foster educational practices). The value-judgment at NE 10, 
1180a27-9 is negative: the Cyclopean way of life is mentioned to typify those 
states that do not engage seriously as moral educators of their citizens since 
infancy but neglect their duty about upbringing. 
30 Dušanić (1990) 375 as reported by Schöpsdau (1994) 367. I could not get hold 
of the Serbian version but Schöpsdau provides a detailed account of Dušanić’s 
interpretation of this passage. 
31 Dillon (1997) 31. Dillon, referring to Od. 9.106-111 (lawlessness and absence 
of agricultural toil), states that ‘[t]he Cyclopes, then, are something of an 
embarrassment ... for anyone concerned to promote a positive picture of the 
Golden Age ... There seems to me therefore to be an element of irony in Plato’s 
bringing them into the discussion here, as the description of their life seems to 
highlight the profound ambiguities of Golden Age living.’ 
32 On the irony of 680c-d, see Martin (2013) 322-25 and 333 (Homer as a 
cultural possession monopolized by Athens only). For my reading of Megillus’ 
reply at 680c6-d3, see below. 
33 A strategy, of course, well attested in the Platonic corpus, when the 
philosophical argument and context so require: see the fundamental 
contribution by Halliwell (2000). For intentional (mis)quotations of Homer in 
the Laws, see recently Mitscherling (2005) (on Od. 17.322-3 at 6, 777a1-2). 
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34 Both interpretations had widespread currency in antiquity: for the former 
(absence of agricultural labour), see Eustath. ad Odyss. I, 1617 ll. 30-43 
Stallbaum drawing on Strabo 11.4.3 (cf. also Strabo 13.1.25, referring to our 
passage of the Laws; on these passages and CPG II, 182, see Di Benedetto (2007) 
1608 n. 24); for the latter, see CPG II, A IV 92b and M V 44. For a further twist on 
the Κυκλώπειος βίος as a merely contemplative life not worth living by the active 
philosopher, see Maximus Tyr. Diss. 15.7.4 Trapp. 
35 For the mixing of the traditions, cf. the Statesman’s account of the lawgiver’s 
art (e.g. Plt. 306aff.). 
36 Differently from England (1921) I 354 ad 681c9-10, I am inclined to take εἰς τὸ 
κοινόν with what precedes (τά σφισιν ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῶν μάλιστα) rather than 
with what follows: εἰς τὸ κοινόν (‘with a view to the common good’) seems to me 
to qualify the overriding criterion by which the selection and review of customs 
is to be made. 
37 For this act of political negotiation to bridge the gap between mere social 
aggregation of households and political community of polis, see Nagle (2006) 23. 
38 On the complex semantic range covered by the word nomos and its shift from 
a descriptive (‘social norm’) to a ‘prescriptive’ function in the fifth BC, see 
Ostwald (1986) 86-108.  For archaic law-making stricto sensu (as opposed to 
traditional ‘nomological’ knowledge of preliterate societies) presupposing the 
existence of the medium of writing as a necessary condition, see Gagarin (2008) 
6, 9 and 39-45 and Bertrand (1999) 60-62; cf. also Hölkeskamp (1993) 98-99 
and (1992) 64-66. On the importance of the connection made by the Athenian 
Stranger between the rule of law proper and writing in our passage of the Laws, 
 
  
37 
                                                                                                                                                                      
see Morrow (1960) 547. On the relationship between 'unwritten customs' and 
'written laws' as envisaged in the second-best city of Magnesia, see 7.793a9-c5 
(on which see Bernard (1999) 60). 
39 For the Cyclopeia of Odyssey 9 as ‘contribut[ing] to the ethnographic program 
of the Apologoi by representing Greek civilization as the goal of this evolutionary 
process’, see Cook (1995) 71-72. On Odysseus as the first ‘ethnographer’ and 
‘historian’, see Marincola (2007). For the varia lectio νόμον ἔγνω (vs. the vulgata 
νόον ἔγνω) at Od. 1.3 defended by Zenodotus at Σ to Od. 1.3e Pontani (καὶ νόον 
ἔγνω: Ζηνόδοτος “νόμον ἔγνω” φησίν· ἄμεινον δὲ τὸ “νόον”, δι’ ὧν Ὀδυσσεὺς 
αὐτὸς εἰσάγεται λέγων “ἠὲ φιλόξεινοι, καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής” [ζ 121]), see 
van der Valk (1949) 97. 
40 For present purposes the scholia to the Odyssey are quoted from Schrader’s 
edition rather than Dindorf’s (see Di Benedetto’s observations, (2007) 1597 n. 
1). For clarity’s sake I have also added, where available, the numeration of the 
corresponding fragment of Antisthenes according to Giannantoni’s SSR edition. 
41 This interpretation of the adjective ὑπερφίαλος was adopted also by 
Aristarchus: cf. scholia A to Il. 15.94b with Di Benedetto (2007) 1604-05. (On the 
possible etymology of ὑπερφίαλος, see Forssman (1969) and now Beekes EDG, II 
s.v. ὑπερφίαλος p. 1534 with further bibliography.) 
42 For the Antisthenic (rather than Aristarchean) paternity of the charitable 
reading of ἀθεμίστων at Od. 9.106, see the arguments by Di Benedetto (2007) 
1604-05.  
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43 For this defence of the Cyclopes’ behaviour towards the Phaeacians, their own 
kin, and how this element of the interpretatio homerica goes back to Antisthenes 
too, see Di Benedetto (2007) 1606-07. 
44 The same explanation for the behaviour of the Cyclopes towards the 
Phaeacians is given also by Eustathius: see Di Benedetto (2007) 1608-09. 
45 For an up-to-date status quaestionis on the presence of Antisthenic material in the 
Homeric scholia, see Pontani (2005) 30 with n. 29 with further bibliography (Di 
Benedetto (2007) remains fundamental). For Antisthenes as Homeric critic, see also 
Montiglio (2011) 20-37, Giannantoni, SSR IV, 331-37, Brancacci (1990) 45-75 (66-69 
on Od. 9.106), Pépin (1993) and more generally Luzzatto (1996). 
46 See e.g. Dümmler (1882) 3-4 on the ‘city of pigs’ in Resp. 2.372c-e and 
Guggenheim (1901) and (1902(. For Plato’s engagement with Antisthenes in the 
Hipp. min., see the balanced approach by Luzzatto (1996) 291-99. 
47 Guggenheim (1902) 527 n. 2 briefly discusses Laws 3, 694c with reference to 
the paradigmatic positive role (resisted by Plato) that the historical figure of 
Cyrus acquires among later Cynics. Dümmler (1882) 22 does quote the two 
Aristotelian passages mentioned above (Politics 1252b22-24. and NE 10m 
1180a27-29) but ignores Plato’s Laws (which Politics 1252b22-24 certainly 
presupposes). Neither Decleva Caizzi nor Giannantoni mention the Laws passage 
in their Antisthenes editions and commentaries. To the best of my knowledge, 
the only exception is Atack (2014) 184 who observes that in Laws 678a-680e 
‘the early family-based societies recall the Homeric Cyclopes, and Antisthenes’ 
arguments that theirs was a just society’; Atack however does not elaborate on 
the connection nor does she highlight the link between ‘natural’ justice and 
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absence of written νόμος. Jolivet (2005) 52 does not consider the possibility of 
Plato’s dependence on Antisthenes at Laws 3.680b-c.   
48 See Hansen (1991) 311-12 on the contemporary cultural climate of the newly 
restored democracy after 401 down to 322 BC, and its emphasis on the over-all 
importance of written law. 
49 See most recently Lane (2013a) and (2013b); cf. already Morrow (1960) 547: 
‘Plato recognizes the importance of written law in his account of the 
development of political society (680a-681d), and the very purpose of the Laws 
is to provide such a known and standing law for the citizens of his state.’    
50 Panno (2007) 260 and Bobonich (1996) 253 with n. 8 on this passage. For the 
self-referential character of the Laws as text, namely as a written law-code, see 
Adomènas (2001) (esp. 34-35 on 7.811b-812a). On the ‘sacred’ aura 
surrounding the written text of the law-code in the Laws, see Nightingale (1993). 
51 On the sense of ἠρεμεῖ ‘stand still, stand as they are’, see England (1921), II 
459-60 ad loc. 
52 See the scepticism of Bobonich (1996) 269-73 and Mayhew (2008) 97-98. 
53 ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῆι, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς 
ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς δ’ αὕτως παρ’ οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ 
γε καὶ μή. πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκηι λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται 
βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ’ ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῶι. See Yunis 
(2011) 230-31. 
54 This point does not figure in Lane’s otherwise illuminating treatment of the 
issue (Lane (2013a) and (2013b)). Cf. also 9, 858d-e: in the second-best city the 
συγγράμματα of the legislator will have more authority than those of poets and 
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other writers: d1-4; only the legislator, among the writers, must advise about 
what is beautiful, good and just: d5-9; of all the writings available in the cities, 
the legislator’s writings must appear, once ‘unpacked’ (διαπτυττόμενα: a clear 
recognition that written law needs expounding and must be internalized via the 
proems to the laws), as the most beautiful and best: e4-7).  
55 At 4, 719d3 the soul of the prototypical Magnesian to which admonition and 
exhortation, through the proems to the laws, will be directed, will not be ‘entirely 
raw’ (μὴ παντάπασιν ὠμῆς ψυχῆς λαβόμενα). For the modality of diffusion of the 
law (written and oral) within Magnesia: cf. Panno (2007) 258-63 and 269-82, 
Laks (2005) 129-46, and Bertrand (1999) 98-103, 229-32.  
56 Cf. Morrow (1960) 547 who observes that Plato is willing to ‘reduce to 
writing— not in the forms of laws, but as admonition and advice — as much as 
possible of the “unwritten customs” or moral rules that he expects his citizens to 
observe’. See Schöpsdau (2003) 625 on the relationship between ἄγραφα νόμιμα 
and written law with relation to the upbringing and education of children at 7, 
793a-d. 
57 Martin (2013) 322. 
58 Martin (2013) 322 and 330 for the paradoxical formulation of a ‘hidden 
centrality’; cf. also (2013) 326: ‘local traditions are thus immediately co-opted or 
trumped by the Athenian through the use of Homer as an Athenian cultural 
weapon’. 
59 Graziosi (2002) 217 observes that ‘Plutarch ... typically interprets the 
statement “Lycurgus brought the poems to the Peloponnese” as a reference to 
the writing down of the Homeric poems’, whereas ‘earlier sources link the 
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expression “to take poems to a place” with the institution of rhapsodic 
performances’.    
60 Martin (2013) 324 and 325. 
61 See Piccirilli in Manfredi and Piccirilli (1980) 226-27 for the sources. For the 
cultural assumptions underlying the two versions, see Graziosi (2002) 219-20. 
62 Cf. Ephorus (4th BC) FGrH 70 F 149. 19 = Strabo 10.4.19, Apollodorus of 
Athens (2nd BC) FGrH 244 F63b = Clem. Al. Strom. Ι 117.3 . 
63 On the monopoly of East Ionia on early epic texts, see Cassio (2002) 111 with 
n. 30; on Creophylus and the Creophylei, see Graziosi (2002) 218. A specific 
Athenian tradition had it that Homer arrived first at Athens via the rival guild of 
the Homeridai of Chios: see Graziosi (2002) 217-28.  
64 Graziosi argues for a fifth century BC Athenian origin (clearly in an anti-
Spartan function: Graziosi (2002) 219-20), whereas Janko (1992) 31 n. 50 
argues for a genuine sixth-century BC Spartan tradition (in the sixth century BC 
Sparta and Samos were close allies). 
65 Λυκοῦργος ἐν Σάμωι ἐγένετο (dgab: ἐτελεύτησε V). καὶ τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν 
παρὰ τῶν ἀπογόνων Κρεοφύλου λαβὼν πρῶτος διεκόμισεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον 
(the text is quoted here according to Dilts’ edition). Marasco traces the origin of 
this strand of the tradition back to Aristotle, cf. Marasco (1978) 175. For later 
sources, see Piccirilli in Manfredi and Piccirilli (1980) 227. 
66 The indulgent and luxurious way of life of the Phaeacians is routinely pointed 
out by Homeric scholarship at least since the fourth century BC (see Di 
Benedetto (2007) 1607 n. 21 for the ancient sources) but I could not find 
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anywhere else a direct association of Homer’s poetry tout court and an Ionian 
style of life.  
67 Weil (1959) 70-71 ad loc. See also Schöpsdau (1994) 368 (‘eine ausdrückliche 
Zurückführung ihrer gesetzlosen Lebensweise auf ihre Rohheit findet sich nicht 
in der Odyssee’), who then goes on to suggest that perhaps Plato ‘einfach aus 
dem Vers Od. 9,215 auf den Zusammenhang zwischen ἀγριότης und 
Gesetzlosigkeit schloss’. 
68 Cf. the Athenian Stranger’s implicit ‘correction’ of Megillus’ inference at 680d 
4-5 ναί· συμμαρτυρεῖ γάρ, καὶ λάβωμέν γε αὐτὸν μηνυτὴν ὅτι τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι 
γίγνονταί ποτε. On the corrective value of γε and the ensuing ‘correct’ inference, 
see already Weil (1959) 71 ad loc.  
69 On Spartan literacy, see Millender (2001), followed by Pébarthe (2006) 38-42 
(but see the caveats of Thomas (2010) 496); cf. also Bertrand (1999) 71-82. It is 
a matter of fact that across his oeuvre Plato twice makes explicit reference to 
Lycurgus as a lawgiver who promulgated written laws: Phaedrus 258c1-2 
(logographos, i.e., in the context, ‘a writer of laws’, see Yunis (2011) 173) and 
Laws 9, 858e3-4. This point is rightly highlighted by Lane (2013a) 59, 64-65; cf. 
esp. p. 65: ‘This is positive support for taking the absence of any classical source 
for a Lycurgan ban on written law to be more than merely an accident of 
transmission.’ 
70 Scodel (2005) 150-52 and 158 on how Odysseus’ ‘unrealistic knowledge’ in 
the ethnographical digression of the apologoi ‘depends on [the apologoi’s] 
participation in an ethnographical subgenre ... the poet gives his own knowledge 
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to the internal narrator, who has an authority that is internally motivated as 
autopsy but in practice belongs to the genre’. 
71 Martin (2013) 323. 
